No Exception for Belief by Rinard, Susanna
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. XCIV No. 1, January 2017
doi: 10.1111/phpr.12229
© 2015 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
No Exception for Belief
SUSANNA RINARD
Harvard University
This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality
of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state.
For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected
value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes
expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is deter-
mined by evidential support. It also contrasts with the common idea that in the case of
belief, there are two different incommensurable senses of rationality, one of which is dis-
tinctively epistemic. I present considerations that favor Equal Treatment over these two
alternatives, reply to objections, and criticize some arguments for Evidentialism. I also
show how Equal Treatment opens the door to a distinctive kind of response to skepticism.
Introduction
Suppose you open a birthday present and find two things: a book reporting
empirical work on happiness, and a machine with three buttons. According
to the book, each of the following is strongly correlated with happiness:
spending time in nature, listening to music, and believing in an afterlife.
You learn that pressing the leftmost button on the machine would instantly
transport you to a rainforest in Costa Rica. Pressing the middle button plays
a Leo Kottke CD (one of your favorites). And if you press the rightmost
button, you will instantly acquire belief in an afterlife—even though your
evidence tells strongly against it.
You want to enjoy your upcoming vacation week, so, on the basis of the
information in the book, you decide to listen to Leo Kottke at home for
awhile, spend the rest of the week in Costa Rica, and believe in an afterlife.
You accomplish these things by pressing the three buttons.
We might ask: is it rational for you to listen to Leo Kottke, to spend
time in Costa Rica, and to believe in an afterlife?1 In the first two cases,
1 Here and throughout, by “rational” I mean rationally permissible, not rationally required.
NO EXCEPTION FOR BELIEF 121
Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research
assuming we fill in the details in the right way, the answer is clearly yes. In
the third case, however, it might seem obvious that the answer is no. Given
that your evidence tells strongly against it, it might seem obvious that
believing in an afterlife couldn’t possibly be rational, no matter how happy
it makes you.
This paper explores a view on which this seemingly obvious claim is
false—a view on which believing against the evidence can be perfectly
rational.2 I have four overall aims. The first is to give a statement of the
view, which I call Equal Treatment. I do this in section 1. The second is to
provide positive considerations in favor of Equal Treatment, which I do in
sections 2, 3, and 9. In sections 2 and 3 I compare the view with two alter-
natives; in section 9 I show how Equal Treatment opens the door to a dis-
tinctive and elegant response to skepticism. My third aim is to respond to
objections, which I do in sections 4, 5, and 6. In section 4 I explore the
possible relevance of doxastic involuntarism; in section 5 I investigate the
role of the agent’s perspective in assessments of rationality; and in section 6
I reply to a number of other objections. My fourth aim is to criticize some
existing arguments for alternative views, which I do in sections 7 and 8. In
section 7 I criticize an argument from the basis of belief; in section 8 I criti-
cize an argument from the transparency of belief.
1. Equal Treatment
Consider states like the following:
(A) Wearing a raincoat
(B) Listening to a Leo Kottke CD
(C) Playing with one’s dog
(D) Mowing the lawn
(E) Being a member of the APA
What determines the rationality of being in some such state S? Possible
answers include:
(1) It is rational for one to be in S just in case S has (or ties for) high-
est expected value.
(2) It is rational for one to be in S just in case doing so would be an
effective means to one’s ends.
(3) It is rational for one to be in S just in case doing so would be an
effective means to the ends one ought to have.
2 Given some plausible assumptions discussed later.
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It is not my aim here to adjudicate between these and other possible
views on this issue. My aim, rather, is to defend the following:
Equal Treatment: However the rationality of states like (A)–(E) is
determined, the rationality of any other state—in
particular, any state—is determined in precisely the
same way.3,4
For example, according to Equal Treatment, if (1) is the correct view
about the rationality of states like (A)–(E), then the rationality of belief is
determined as follows: it is rational for one to believe P just in case doing
so has (or ties for) highest expected value. So, if believing in an afterlife
has highest expected value, then it is rational to so believe, even if the evi-
dence tells against it. If, on the other hand, (2) is correct for (A)–(E), then,
according to Equal Treatment, a rational belief is one that would be an
effective means to one’s ends (even if the evidence tells against it). And so
on.
The alternative to Equal Treatment is Exceptionalism, according to
which, when it comes to determining the rationality of different possible
states one might be in, we need to make an exception for belief, and deter-
mine the rationality of belief states in a way that is different from how we
determine the rationality of other states, such as (A)–(E). One prominent
form of Exceptionalism is Evidentialism, which says (roughly) that it is
rational for one to believe P just in case P is supported by one’s evidence.5
Evidentialism (on this formulation) assumes that there is a single sense
of rationality that can apply to belief states. But there is an important alter-
native form of Exceptionalism that denies this. According to a view I’ll call
Different Senses, there are two different, incommensurable senses of
rationality relative to which we can evaluate the very same belief. One is
the sense of rationality that applies to states like (A)–(E). The other is a dis-
tinctively epistemic sense of rationality that applies only to beliefs.
In the next two sections I’ll point out several disadvantages of Eviden-
tialism and Different Senses that Equal Treatment avoids. Here, though, I’ll
emphasize one particular benefit of Equal Treatment. Most philosophers
3 Here, “precisely the same way” should be understood as a robust, substantive require-
ment, not a thin, minimal requirement. For example, the following view does not treat
all states in precisely the same way, even though there is a superficial sense in which it
applies the same rule to each state: For all states S, S is rational just in case either (1) S
is a belief state in which the proposition believed is supported by the evidence; or (2) S
is not a belief state, and S has (or ties for) highest expected value.
4 A view in the general vicinity of this one is defended in Booth (2012).
5 Proponents of Exceptionalism about belief may also defend exceptionalist views about
other mental states, like intention, fear, regret, hope, etc. In this paper, however, I will
focus on belief.
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agree that we should aim for simplicity and elegance in our theorizing.
These considerations tell in favor of Equal Treatment.6 After all, Equal
Treatment demands a theory of rationality on which all states are treated
alike. Any version of Exceptionalism, on the other hand, presents us with a
fractured and thereby more complicated theory of rationality which says one
thing about states like (A)–(E) and something entirely different about belief
states.
Although I have thus far focused on Equal Treatment, I am also interested
in a more general claim—which I will call “Equal TreatmentG”—of which
Equal Treatment is merely an instance. First, notice that there are normative
notions which some might consider distinct from rationality, e.g. justifica-
tion, moral permissibility, reason, the all-things considered should, etc. Equal
TreatmentG says that, with respect to any such normative notion, however it
is determined whether it applies to states like (A)–(E), this determination is
made for belief states in precisely the same way. For example, consider the
view that, for states like (A)–(E), it’s morally permissible to be in that state
just in case doing so maximizes overall global utility. If this is right, then
according to Equal TreatmentG, it’s morally permissible to believe some
proposition P just in case doing so maximizes overall global utility.
Equal TreatmentG itself is entirely neutral on how, if at all, these
different normative notions are related to each other. For example, it is
compatible with Equal TreatmentG that rationality is essentially connected
with self-interest, but that morality is essentially not connected with self-in-
terest. Equal TreatmentG simply says that, if this is so for the rationality
and morality of states like (A)–(E), then it is so for the rationality and
morality of belief states. Equal TreatmentG is also compatible with views on
which rationality and morality are much more closely connected (or even
the same). On one view, for example, it is impossible for a state like (A)–
(E) to be both permitted by rationality but prohibited by morality. Equal
TreatmentG, when combined with this view, would then entail that it is
impossible for a belief state to be both rationally permitted but morally pro-
hibited.
In short, Equal TreatmentG does not take a stand on how (or whether)
different normative notions are connected to each other. It simply requires
that, for each such notion, however it is determined whether it applies to
states like (A)–(E), this determination is made for belief states in exactly
the same way.
One thing that does follow from Equal TreatmentG is that, for every nor-
mative notion, whether the evidence supports some proposition P has no
constitutive connection to whether that notion applies to the state of
believing P—that is, to whether belief in P is justified; or rational; or
6 A similar sentiment is voiced in Papineau (2013).
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morally permissible; or prescribed by the all-things-considered should; or
whether there is a reason in favor of it; etc. Of course, like any fact, facts
about evidential support may become relevant if certain contingent facts
hold. Whether a chair is blue has no constitutive connection to whether sit-
ting in it is rational, but it may gain relevance to this question if, say, sitting
in a blue chair is the best means to your ends. Similarly, P’s being sup-
ported by the evidence may gain relevance to the rationality of believing P
if, say, believing what the evidence supports concerning P is the best means
to your ends. But, on its own, evidential support has no automatic relevance
to the evaluation of belief along any genuinely normative dimension.7
2. Comparing Equal Treatment and Evidentialism
We have already seen that Equal Treatment has one advantage over Eviden-
tialism: greater theoretical simplicity. However, there is a benefit of Eviden-
tialism which Equal Treatment may seem to lack. Evidentialism can explain
why, pre-theoretically, there seems to be an important connection between
the rationality of belief and truth-conduciveness. I will argue, however, that
Equal Treatment can explain this as well. Moreover, there are some cases in
which factors that are not truth-conducive seem to matter to the rationality
of a belief. Equal Treatment has the flexibility to handle these cases with
ease, whereas Evidentialism cannot accommodate them at all.
As a matter of contingent fact, in most ordinary cases we benefit more,
and are better able to pursue our goals, if we have true beliefs rather than
false beliefs (or no beliefs at all). For example, I’m best able to pursue my
goal of attending the colloquium talk if I have true beliefs about when and
where it is. I’m best able to care for my children, plan for retirement, and
buy a suitable house if I have true beliefs about which foods are most nutri-
tious, how the inflation rate compares with the rate of return on an invest-
ment, and what a crack in the basement indicates about the condition of the
foundation. This generalizes beyond practical matters. I’m best able to pur-
sue my intellectual goals and projects if I have true beliefs about whether
the existence of a perfect God is compatible with the existence of evil,
whether ontological nihilism is true, and whether there are infinitesimal
numbers.
Given this, and given that the nature of evidence is to indicate truth,
Equal Treatment says that most of the time—in a wide variety of circum-
stances, and with respect to a wide variety of propositions—a rational belief
is one that matches the evidence. So Equal Treatment can perfectly well
explain why, pre-theoretically, we take there to be an important connection
between the rationality of belief and truth-conduciveness.
7 A view in this general vicinity is also defended in Wrenn (2007).
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Moreover, Equal Treatment has a certain flexibility on this point—which
Evidentialism lacks—which allows it to better explain unusual cases in
which factors that are not truth-conducive seem relevant to the rationality of
a belief. For example, consider someone suffering from a potentially fatal
illness. Her prognosis is uncertain, but she knows her chances of surviving
are higher if she believes she’ll make it. There’s something compelling
about the idea that it’s rational for her to be optimistic and believe she’ll
recover, even if the evidence on the matter is equivocal. Similarly, consider
an athlete who knows her performance will be enhanced if she’s confident
she’ll win. Again, such confidence can seem rational, even if it goes beyond
the available evidence. Equal Treatment has no trouble explaining this. But
Evidentialism does.
Another class of cases involves promising or resolving to do something
when the available evidence does not clearly support the proposition that
one will keep one’s promise or resolution. For example, suppose that
roughly half of those who marry and sincerely promise to stay together end
up divorced; and that roughly half of those who sincerely resolve to quit
smoking don’t succeed. Plausibly, it can nonetheless be rational for one
familiar with these statistics to sincerely promise to stay married, or to sin-
cerely resolve to quit smoking. Berislav Marusic (2012) has argued that sin-
cerely promising or resolving to φ requires believing that one will φ. If so,
it seems one can rationally believe one will φ even if this goes beyond the
available evidence. Once again, Equal Treatment easily accommodates such
cases, but Evidentialism does not.
Ryan Preston-Roedder (2013) draws attention to a phenomenon he calls
“faith in humanity,” which he attributes to Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin
Luther King, Jr. Preston-Roedder characterizes faith in humanity as,
roughly, a confidence in the goodness of others and their ability to rise to
the occasion that may go beyond available evidence on the matter. This
confidence, argues Preston-Roedder, was essential to the success of non-vio-
lent resistance movements lead by King and Gandhi, and is part of what we
admire about them. The Evidentialist is forced to view this as a rational
defect; the defender of Equal Treatment is not.
Or, imagine a scenario in which one’s evidence is insufficient to support
any substantive view one way or the other about the relative intelligence or
abilities of members of different racial or gender groups. If one were to
believe nonetheless that there are no such differences, would that be
irrational? Evidentialism entails that it is, but it is open to a defender of
Equal Treatment to take a different view of the matter.
There is another type of case that is also relevant to the comparison
of Evidentialism and Equal Treatment, although in a slightly different
way. Consider a scientist who is choosing between two empirically
equivalent hypotheses, one of which is simpler than the other. (Example:
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special relativity vs neo-Lorentzianism.) Most philosophers agree that it’s
rational for the scientist to believe the simpler hypothesis. A defender of
Equal Treatment can easily account for this. However, the Evidentialist
who seeks to accommodate this judgment faces the notoriously difficult
challenge of trying to defend the view that simplicity is a guide to truth.
Finally, I’ll present an analogy which helps illustrate the role played by
evidence, according to Equal Treatment, in the rationality of belief. Let a
musical perfectionist be someone who always sings on key, under all cir-
cumstances. Usually, this is just what rationality requires, since singing on
key is generally more pleasing to both audience and singer. But there are
possible atypical situations in which singing on key would actually have
low expected value. (Suppose an evil and capricious tyrant has threatened
to torture the singer unless he sings out of key.) In such a situation, musi-
cal perfectionism, although usually rational, would actually be irrational.
According to Equal Treatment, the situation is perfectly analogous for the
evidential perfectionist, who always apportions their beliefs exactly to the
evidence. Like musical perfectionism, evidential perfectionism is rational
most of the time. But it would be a mistake, according to Equal Treat-
ment, to think that it’s always rational. In some atypical situations, eviden-
tial perfectionism actually has lower expected value. In such
circumstances, according to Equal Treatment, evidential perfectionism is,
in fact, irrational.
The upshot of this section is that Equal Treatment compares favorably
with Evidentialism. Each can explain the central importance of truth-con-
duciveness to the rationality of belief, but Equal Treatment, unlike Eviden-
tialism, can also explain why, sometimes, non-evidential factors seem
relevant to the rationality of a belief. (I make similar points in Rinard
(forthcoming), in which I put forward the view that only pragmatic or
moral considerations constitute genuine reasons for belief.) Moreover, as
emphasized earlier, Equal Treatment constitutes a more unified approach
to rationality: it treats all states alike, whereas Evidentialism requires a
fractured theory of rationality involving different criteria for different
states.
Finally, it is worth mentioning a few other views that also conflict
with Equal Treatment. One might hold that the rationality of a belief is
a matter of the reliability of the process by which it was formed, or a
matter of its satisfying various safety and/or sensitivity conditions. Analo-
gous points to the ones made here about Evidentialism apply to such
views.8
8 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for suggesting that I include a com-
parison of Equal Treatment and Evidentialism.
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3. Comparing Equal Treatment and Different Senses
According to Different Senses there are two distinct, incommensurable
senses of rationality that both apply to belief states. One is the same as the
sense of rationality that applies to states like (A)–(E). The other is a distinc-
tively epistemic sense of rationality that applies only to belief states.9
Philosophers who use the phrase “epistemic rationality” do not all have
the same idea in mind. Some take it to be a sort of rationality essentially
connected with truth (perhaps via the notion of evidence, or the notion of a
reliable belief-forming process); others take it to be essentially connected
with knowledge; and so forth. What is important here is just that, whatever
epistemic rationality is, according to Different Senses a single belief state
can be rational in this epistemic sense while being irrational in the other
(non-epistemic) sense, and vice versa. According to Equal Treatment, on
the other hand, every belief state is univocally either rational or not.10 I will
argue that this is an important advantage that Equal Treatment has over Dif-
ferent Senses.
It is natural to think of rationality as constituting an ideal to which one
might aspire, and by which one might be guided. But rationality is poorly
suited to play this role if it consists of two different voices urging us in
incompatible directions. It is metaphysically impossible to believe P while
also failing to believe P. And yet according to Different Senses, there are
cases in which, unless one does so, one is bound to be irrational in at least
one sense. How could one coherently aspire to satisfy the demands of
rationality when doing so (in both of its senses) would be metaphysically
impossible?
According to Equal Treatment, on the other hand, rationality speaks in a
single voice. Insofar as we look to rationality for guidance, and conceive of
it as an ideal to which one might coherently aspire, this tells in favor of
Equal Treatment and against Different Senses. Moreover, as we saw above,
Equal Treatment is a more unified approach to rationality: it treats all states,
including belief states, alike, whereas Different Senses postulates special
complexities in the case of belief that do not arise for states like (A)–(E).11
4. Doxastic Involuntarism and Equal Treatment
Many people, much of the time, have voluntary control over whether they
are in states (A)–(E). But it’s not the case that many people, much of the
9 A view along these lights concerning different senses of “ought” is defended in Feldman
(2000).
10 Given the plausible assumption that only one sense of rationality applies to states like
(A)–(E).
11 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for suggesting that I include a discus-
sion of Different Senses.
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time, have voluntary control over their beliefs.12 An objector might claim
that this difference tells against Equal Treatment, by appealing to a princi-
ple—let’s call it (*)—according to which only states over which one has
voluntary control are assessable for rationality.13
I take no stand here on whether (*) is correct. What I will argue, rather,
is that (*) and Equal Treatment are orthogonal. In particular, they are per-
fectly compatible with each other. What is incompatible with (*), however,
is each of (1)–(3) (the candidate theories, described in section 1, for the
rationality of states like (A)–(E)). As we will see, though, they can easily
be modified to avoid this.
First, let’s investigate further the supposed involuntariness of belief, and
the supposed voluntariness of states (A)–(E). This much is true: If I sit still,
close my eyes, and try really hard to believe, say, that pigs fly, I will likely
fail. But the same is true of states (A)–(E). One can’t change one’s member-
ship status in the APA, for example, by sitting still, closing one’s eyes, and
trying really hard.
Of course, this doesn’t mean we lack voluntary control over (A)–(E). It
just means that the control we have is indirect. To exercise my control over
whether I am an APA member, for example, I would visit various websites,
fill out certain forms, etc.
However, there still seems to be an asymmetry between states (A)–(E)
and belief. In the case of belief, we often lack even indirect control.14
However, the important thing to notice is that this is not a deep, in-prin-
ciple difference, but merely an accidental one. The machine described in
the introduction is perfectly possible, and it makes belief change as easy
as pressing a button.15 Moreover, that many of us, much of the time,
have voluntary control over states (A)–(E) is purely accidental. Someone
who lacks access to a CD player does not have voluntary control over
whether they listen to a Leo Kottke CD; similarly for someone who is
deaf.
The picture that emerges, then, is that belief states, and states like (A)–
(E), are fundamentally similar: for any such state, there are possible circum-
stances in which one has voluntary control over whether one is in it, and
12 This is contested by some (e.g. Steup (2000) and Ryan (2003)). My position in this
paper is neutral on this claim, but here I grant it to the objector for the sake of argu-
ment.
13 William Alston (1988) endorses a principle along these lines, but he focuses on deonto-
logical notions like “ought,” rather than rationality. The dialectic concerning such
notions is perfectly parallel to the one in the main text concerning rationality. See Smith
(2005) for an argument against (*).
14 Similar points appear in Alston (1988) and others.
15 Others have also pointed out that there is no in-principle barrier to indirect control over
belief; see, for example, Alston (1988), Huss (2009), and Jordan (2006, chapter 2).
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possible circumstances in which one does not, depending on a variety of
external factors.
For a defender of (*), who holds that rational assessment is possible only
in cases of voluntary control, what this reveals is not that there is any prob-
lem with Equal Treatment. The upshot, rather, is that (1)–(3) require modifi-
cation. For example, as it stands, (1) makes no mention of voluntariness, so
it has the consequence that if listening to a Leo Kottke CD has greater
expected value than not listening, then listening is rationally required, even
for someone who is deaf, or lacks access to CDs. To gain compatibility
with (*), (1) could be modified as follows:
(1*) It is rational for one to be in state S at t just in case one has voluntary
control over whether one is in S at t, and, compared to alternatives over
which one has voluntary control, S has (or ties for) greatest expected
value.
(2) and (3) can be modified similarly, to yield (2*) and (3*). The upshot,
then, is that Equal Treatment is in no way committed to the view that
rationally requires one to believe propositions one is unable to believe.
Rather, what follows is only that if, say, (1*) is correct for states like (A)–
(E), then, if one has voluntary control over whether one believes P (perhaps
by pressing a button), and if so believing has highest expected value among
one’s genuine options, then it is rationally permissible to so believe—re-
gardless of what the evidence supports.
One consequence of this is that if (*) is correct, then since, as a matter
of fact, we typically do not have voluntary control over our beliefs, our
beliefs are in fact typically not assessable for rationality. This consequence
should be embraced by one who is moved both by the considerations in
favor of Equal Treatment and also by the considerations in favor of (*).
Suppose that, as a matter of fact, we typically lack voluntary control over
whether we listened to music. We can imagine, for example, that we are
trapped in a location where music is played, or not, at the discretion of
some being we cannot influence. In such a situation, (*) has it that states
like listening to music would not be assessable for rationality. Why should
things be any different for belief?
Thus far I have emphasized the fundamental similarity between states
like (A)–(E) and belief. Some philosophers have argued, however, that there
is one respect in which these states are fundamentally different: it is possi-
ble for us to have direct control over states (A)–(E), but impossible to have
direct control over belief. In response, I will first point out that, even if true,
this does not undermine Equal Treatment. Second, I’ll briefly register my
doubts concerning the most prominent argument for this claim, from
Williams (1970).
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It would be quite implausible to suppose that, just because direct control
over some state S* is impossible, while direct control over S is possible,
different theories of the rationality of states S and S* are called for, even in
cases in which one’s actual control over both is indirect. To see this, con-
sider the state of listening* to a Leo Kottke CD, where one listens* just in
case one listens and one’s listening was not the result of direct control.
Since, as a matter of fact, we have no direct control over listening to a Leo
Kottke CD, whenever we listen to one, we also listen* to it. Clearly, the
same standards of rationality should apply to listening and listening*. For
example, if (1) is true of listening, then it should also be true of listening*.
This is in no way undermined by the observation that, given the way it was
defined, direct control over listening* is impossible, while direct control
over listening is possible. The takeaway message is that, even if direct con-
trol over belief is impossible, this does not undermine Equal Treatment.
However, I also doubt the supposed impossibility of direct control over
belief. The most prominent argument for this appears in Williams (1970).
Says he, “I could not, in full consciousness, regard this as a belief of mine,
i.e. as something that I take to be true, and also know that I acquired it at
will.” (p. 148) This is because acquiring a belief at will, he says, amounts
to acquiring it regardless of its truth—but to believe it is to take it to be
true.
However, the fact is that although this may be difficult for actual
human beings, given contingent features of our psychology, it does not
seem in-principle impossible.16 There is no reason why there could not be
a creature who, at one instant, fails to believe P but holds that doing so
would be good, and wills to believe it regardless of its truth; and then, at
the next instant, has a genuine belief that P—takes it to be true—while
acknowledging that the method by which they acquired this belief was
insensitive to its truth.17 Direct control over belief is not, it seems, in-prin-
ciple impossible.
I conclude this section with two miscellaneous remarks.
First, given my concern in this section to argue that (*) is compatible
with Equal Treatment, it is worth noting that (*) is, at least prima facie,
incompatible with both Evidentialism and Different Senses, the two most
prominent alternatives to Equal Treatment. Sometimes one is unable to
believe in accordance with the evidence. This is judged irrational by the
evidentialist, and irrational in at least one important sense, by the defender
of Different Senses.18
16 Similar points appear in Johnston (1995), Winters (1979), and Scott-Kakures (2000),
among others.
17 Instances of this are described in Schoenfield (2014).
18 This point is also made in Reisner (2009).
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Second, the reader may have wondered why, at the outset, I set things
up in terms of the rational assessment of states, rather than actions. That is,
why am I focusing on the question whether belief states should be evaluated
in the same way as other states, rather than the question whether beliefs
should be evaluated in the same way as actions? The reason is that actions
are by nature voluntary, whereas being in a state is not. This means that,
since belief is not by nature voluntary, there is a fundamental difference
between belief and action. However, it would be a mistake to infer from
this that we need an entirely different set of standards for the rational
assessment of beliefs. What belief is relevantly like, for purposes of rational
assessment, is other, non-belief states—such as (A)–(E)—over which one
may or may not have voluntary control, depending on various accidents of
circumstance. This is why I set things up in terms of states, rather than
actions—so that the parity of rational (and other) normative evaluation of
belief and non-belief postulated by Equal Treatment would not be obscured
by the fact that we sometimes lack voluntary control over our beliefs.19
5. Taking the Agent’s Perspective into Account
As we have seen, Equal Treatment is completely neutral concerning the the-
ory of rationality for states like (A)–(E). All it says is that the true theory,
whatever it is, should also extend to belief. Nonetheless, assessing the plau-
sibility of various competing theories of rationality for states like (A)–(E) is
not entirely irrelevant to Equal Treatment. It is important to consider the
most plausible theories, in order to make sure we don’t encounter any prob-
lems in generalizing them to belief. We saw in the previous section that tak-
ing into account a possible way in which voluntariness may be relevant to
rationality did not pose any special problems in the case of belief. In this
section, I’ll consider a variety of ways of taking into account the agent’s
perspective, and argue that all of them are compatible with Equal Treat-
ment.
First, recall (2), which says that a state is rational just in case being in
that state is an effective means to the agent’s ends. As we have seen, this
can be unproblematically applied to belief states, as follows: it is rational
for an agent to believe P just in case believing P is an effective means to
their ends. However, some might worry that (2) fails as a theory of rational-
ity because it is too objective; it ignores the agent’s perspective.
To see the putative problem, consider a case in which, although I have
no inkling of this, the world happens to be arranged in such a way that cut-
ting off my left hand is the most effective means to my ends. According to
19 One might hold that only actions are assessable for rationality. This view is discussed in
section 4; it is shown there to be compatible with Equal Treatment.
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(2), this means that it would be rational for me to cut off my left hand. But
that may seem implausible.
I won’t take a stand here on whether this shows that (2) is false. My aim
is merely to argue that those who are moved by this thought can still accept
Equal Treatment. One possible way to modify (2) in response to this worry
would be to propose that a state is rational just in case the agent believes
that no alternative state is a more effective means to their ends. However,
when applied to belief, this would require the agent to have infinitely many
beliefs. Moreover, this proposed requirement for rationality is implausible in
other respects: it is overly intellectualized and highly demanding. Therefore,
a better way to respond is to modify (2) as follows: (2’): a state is rational
unless the agent believes that some alternative state is a more effective
means to their ends. We can extend this to belief states, as follows: it is
rational for an agent to believe a proposition P unless the agent believes that
some alternative to believing P would be a more effective means to their
ends. This does not require infinitely many beliefs, because a belief that P
is rational on (2’) if the agent has no beliefs about the relative efficacy of
alternatives to that belief. It is also worth pointing out that, although (2’)
makes the presence or absence of other beliefs relevant to the rationality of
a belief, it does not trivialize the notion of rational belief. It is not uncom-
mon to believe P, but to believe that not believing P would be a more effec-
tive means to one’s ends. In such cases, (2’) would deem belief in P
irrational.
However, one might worry that (2’) goes too far in the other direction: it
is too subjective. According to (2’), if I have the belief that some state is
the most effective means to my ends, then—whether or not that belief is
rational—being in that state is rational for me. For example, suppose I irra-
tionally believe that cutting off my left hand is the most effective means to
my ends. Then, according to (2’), it is rational for me to cut off my hand.
But that may seem implausible.
Again, I remain neutral on whether this criticism is correct; my aim is
just to argue that even those moved by it can accept Equal Treatment. One
response is to propose (2’’): a state is rational just in case it would be
rational for the agent to believe that no alternative state is a more effective
means to their ends. (We don’t require that the agent actually have this
belief, just that it would be rational for her to have it.) However, (2’’) may
seem to be problematic for Equal Treatment. Applying it to belief states
yields the following: it is rational for an agent to believe P just in case it
would be rational for that agent to believe that no alternative is a more
effective means to their ends. But this is circular.
One way to avoid this circularity would be to give a different account of
the rationality of the meta-belief (i.e. the belief that no alternative to believ-
ing P is a more effective means to their ends). For example, one might
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propose that this meta-belief is rational just in case it’s supported by the
agent’s evidence. However, this strategy should not be pursued by a defen-
der of Equal Treatment. The idea that some beliefs are assessed for rational-
ity in one way, while other beliefs are assessed for rationality in a different
way, is incompatible with the core idea of Equal Treatment that all states
are to be treated alike by one’s theory of rationality.
A different proposal in this vicinity is that it’s rational to believe P
just in case the agent’s evidence supports the proposition that no alterna-
tive to believing P is a more effective means to their ends. This is com-
patible with the letter of Equal Treatment, since it results from applying
to belief the following general proposal: for any state, it is rational for
an agent to be in that state just in case their evidence supports the
proposition that no alternative would be a more effective means to their
ends. However, this proposal may seem to be in tension with the spirit
of Equal Treatment in that it involves a constitutive connection between
rationality and evidence. Granted, it’s not the case, on this view, that the
rationality of a belief is a matter of the evidence for that belief; but
given that a defender of Equal Treatment denies this, it would be odd
for them to then propose that the rationality of a belief is a matter of
the evidence for some other belief.20
My suggestion is that, rather than viewing the circularity of (2’’) as a
problem and looking for ways to avoid it, the defender of Equal Treatment
should simply embrace it. Note that in general, it is not the case that circu-
lar claims are thereby false. For example, the claim that it’s rational to
believe P just in case it’s rational to believe P is both circular and true.
What can make some circular claims frustrating, though, is not necessarily
that they are false, but rather that in some cases (such as the one just men-
tioned), they are completely uninformative. However, not all circular claims
have this feature. In particular, the application of (2’’) to belief states does
not. For example, (2’’) entails that if you believe P, but you also believe
that not believing P would be a more effective means to your ends, then at
least one of your beliefs is irrational. So (2’’), though circular, is not
thereby shown to be false; and it is not without real substance. So it is open
to a defender of Equal Treatment to simply embrace the circularity in this
case.
Finally, it is worth noting in this context that phenomena of regress and
circularity have long been discussed in the context of more traditional views
such as coherentism, foundationalism, infinitism, etc. These sorts of issues
arise for many different approaches to the rationality of belief and are not
unique to Equal Treatment.
20 Thanks to Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Miriam Schoenfield for emphasizing this to me.
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In this section I have considered a variety of ways in which the agent’s
perspective might (or might not) be taken into account, and I have argued
that all of them are compatible with Equal Treatment.21
6. Other Objections and Replies
This section responds to four objections. The first holds that rational assess-
ment applies only in cases of direct control; the second, that rational assess-
ment applies only to actions; the third, that Equal Treatment endorses
wishful thinking; and the fourth, that it countenances belief in contradic-
tions.
Let (**) be the following principle: states over which one has merely
indirect control are not assessable for rationality; rational assessment applies
only to states over which one has direct control.22 My discussion of (**)
will in some ways parallel that of (*) (the principle, discussed in section 2,
that only states over which we have voluntary control are assessable for
rationality). As with (*), I will remain neutral on (**), and will be con-
cerned rather to argue that it is perfectly compatible with Equal Treatment.
What a defender of (**) must deny is not Equal Treatment, but rather (1)–
(3)—the candidate conceptions of rationality from section 1—and all varia-
tions on them so far discussed.
(**) is radically at odds with our commonsense conception of the
rational assessment of (A)–(E). According to (**), none of these states is
assessable for rationality at all, since our control over each is indirect. For
example, on this view, there is no actual situation in which listening to a
Leo Kottke CD is rational. The only states in the vicinity which are assess-
able for rationality are those over which we have direct control, such as
intending to press the play button. Clearly, (**) is incompatible with (1)–(3)
(as well as the modified versions discussed in previous sections).
(**) is, however, perfectly compatible with Equal Treatment, which says
only that, when it comes to the potential rational assessment of belief states,
it should parallel that of (A)–(E). If the truth is that (A)–(E), when our con-
trol over them is indirect, are never rationally assessable, then, according to
Equal Treatment, the same is true of belief states. One upshot, then, is that
even if we did have a belief-changing machine, according to (**), the
resulting beliefs would not be assessable for rationality. Only states like that
of intending to press the believe-in-an-afterlife button would be.
21 My thoughts in this section has been influenced by Richard Foley’s books The Theory
of Epistemic Rationality (1987) and Working Without a Net (1992). I have not, how-
ever, discussed Foley’s own view. Whether his view is compatible with Equal Treatment
depends on certain subtle matters of interpretation.
22 Brian Hedden (2015) defends a view along these lines.
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One thing this illustrates is that, strictly speaking, Equal Treatment by
itself does not entail that it can be rational to believe against the evidence,
since, by itself, it does not entail that belief states are ever assessable for
rationality. The combination of Equal Treatment with any commonsense
conception of the rationality of (A)–(E)—any view roughly along the lines
of (1)–(3)—does entail this, however. For simplicity, I will sometimes pre-
suppose, in the remainder of the paper, that some view in the vicinity of
(1)–(3) is correct for states like (A)–(E). However, nothing important rests
on this, and strictly speaking it is not among the commitments of Equal
Treatment.
The second objection is structurally similar to the first: it holds that only
actions are assessable for rationality; states never are. Once again, this view
is incompatible with the commonsense idea that states like (A)–(E) are
assessable for rationality; but, once again, it is compatible with Equal Treat-
ment. If this view is right, then, on the assumption that beliefs are states,
not actions, it follows from Equal Treatment that beliefs are never assess-
able for rationality.
The third objection to Equal Treatment alleges that according to Equal
Treatment, any belief that results from wishful thinking is thereby rational.
However, Equal Treatment does not have this consequence. Wishful think-
ing is a matter of believing a proposition because one wishes it were true.
Equal Treatment says (roughly) that the following is rational: believing a
proposition such that it would be good if one believed it. These are
importantly different: what one wishes were true, and what would be good
for one to believe is true, often come apart. For example, I wish it were
true that, if I jumped off of my roof, I would sprout wings and fly. How-
ever, it would be very bad for me to believe that this is true. Believing
this would not be an effective means to my ends; it has very low
expected value.
There is another feature of Equal Treatment worth noting in this context.
On some views, if one desires to do something just for its own sake, then,
other things equal, it is rational to do it. For example, if I desire to jump
off a bridge just for its own sake, then, other things equal, it is rational for
me to do so. If so, then, according to Equal Treatment, if I desire to
believe P for its own sake, then, other things equal, doing so is rational for
me. This may initially sound odd. But I think its oddity can be largely
explained by pointing out two things. First, in the case of belief (as in the
case of jumping off a bridge), other things are rarely equal. What we
believe is likely to impact our ability to pursue our other projects in signifi-
cant ways. Second, it is unusual for creatures like us to desire to have a
particular belief just for its own sake. That said, a defender of Equal Treat-
ment should embrace the consequence that, if other things really are equal,
and if one really does desire to believe P for its own sake, then, believing
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P is rational (if, that is, they want to say the same thing about jumping off
a bridge).23
Finally, one might object to Equal Treatment by pointing out that there
are possible situations in which, according to Equal Treatment, it would be
rational to believe contradictions, to violate modus ponens, to believe Moore-
paradoxical propositions, etc. (Imagine, for example, that a trustworthy
powerful being promises lives of pure bliss for you and all other beings if
you believe a contradiction.)
The objector is correct that Equal Treatment has this consequence. The
appropriate response for a defender of Equal Treatment, however, is simply
to embrace it. The idea that there is anything inherently wrong with believ-
ing contradictions is just a symptom of evidentialist thinking.
It is worth noting here that Equal Treatment would issue an absolute pro-
hibition against belief in contradictions if, say, (2) is true, and your sole
ultimate end is to avoid believing contradictions. But what kind of person
values abstaining from belief in contradictions over infinite bliss for every-
one? (Suppose the only alternative is infinite misery for all.)
Now, as pointed out earlier in the paper, in most ordinary cases Equal
Treatment will recommend believing in accordance with your evidence. In
those cases, Equal Treatment will recommend against believing contradic-
tions. But there is no blanket prohibition against doing so—and, for a
defender of Equal Treatment, this is quite as it should be.
7. The Argument from the Basis of Belief
In “The Rationality of Belief and Other Propositional Attitudes,” Thomas
Kelly argues that practical considerations (such as expected consequences or
expected value) can never rationalize belief. This is incompatible with Equal
Treatment, insofar as one thinks, as Kelly does, that practical considerations
can rationalize states like (A)–(E).
Kelly begins by claiming that, in general, the rationality of one’s φ-ing is
determined by the basis of one’s φ-ing. I will grant this claim for the sake
of argument. (A potential worry concerns the notorious obscurity of the bas-
ing relation, but I won’t press the point here.) Kelly then argues that beliefs
cannot be based on practical considerations. He allows that practical consid-
erations may prompt one to embark on a project of acquiring evidence for a
proposition, which one may then end up believing. However, he claims that
in such a case, although the practical considerations did cause one (indi-
rectly) to have the belief, they are not the basis for one’s belief; rather,
one’s basis for the belief is the evidence acquired.
23 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for suggesting that I discuss this con-
sequence of Equal Treatment.
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A defender of Equal Treatment can respond by pointing to a number of
different cases in which beliefs can, it seems, be based directly on practical
considerations. For example, it is not uncommon for theists to cite as the
basis for their religious beliefs that those beliefs give meaning to their lives.
Inga Nayding (2011) references specific instances of this. Also, recall the
optimistic patient who believes she’ll recover, and the confident athlete who
believes she’ll win, even though they realize that the evidence is equivocal.
Similarly, someone might believe that they will quit smoking, or stay mar-
ried, because they resolved or promised that they would, even though they
know that the success rate for those relevantly like them is not high.
Another class of cases involves beliefs based on loyalty to friends or family,
or beliefs (such as those of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr.) based on a
general faith in humanity. Worsnip (ms) develops cases like these, and
some others, in more detail.
I’ll also note that Roger White (2010) reports that, for a brief time as a
young child, he was troubled by the possibility of monsters under the bed.
But then, he says, he chose to believe that there weren’t any—not on the
basis of any evidence to this effect, but rather “because it would make my
life easier to believe” that there were not.
Finally, consider the following possible reaction to skeptical argu-
ments. We can imagine someone who is convinced by the skeptic that
their evidence does not support, say, that they have hands, or that the
sun will rise tomorrow, but who chooses to believe these propositions
nonetheless, on the basis of practical reasons for doing so. (Some ways
of interpreting David Hume and the Pyrrhonists might place them in this
category.)
8. The Argument from Transparency
In “A New Argument for Evidentialism,” Nishi Shah claims that Eviden-
tialism follows from two premises, which he calls Transparency and The
Deliberative Constraint on Reasons (DCR henceforth). Shah takes Trans-
parency to be obvious; he does not argue for it, but simply presupposes
it. He anticipates that his opponent will agree with Transparency, but
will reject DCR. Thus, much of his paper is devoted to arguing that
anyone who accepts Transparency should also accept DCR; this is
because, according to Shah, DCR is the best explanation for Trans-
parency.
My reaction to Shah’s argument is different from the reaction he antici-
pates. I am happy to grant DCR (at least for the sake of argument). My
concerns center on Transparency. Shah’s definition of Transparency is as
follows:
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Transparency: The deliberative question whether to believe that P
inevitably gives way to the factual question whether
p, because the answer to the latter question will
determine the answer to the former.
In order to evaluate Transparency, we need to know what “the deliberative
question whether to believe that P” is. On the most natural interpretation, this
is the question “Should I believe P?”. If so, what Transparency says is that the
question “Should I believe P?” inevitably gives way to the question “Is P
true?” because the answer to the latter will determine the answer to the for-
mer. However, this claim is question-begging in the context of a disagreement
with a proponent of Equal Treatment. Imagine someone with the three-button
machine who is trying to answer the question “Should I believe in an after-
life?” They may know the answer to the question “Is the proposition that there
is an afterlife true?,” but, if they are a proponent of Equal Treatment, this need
not settle for them the question of whether they should believe it. Suppose
they know that there is no afterlife, but they hold that whether they should
believe that there is is determined by the expected value of so believing. That
P is false doesn’t settle the expected value of believing it. It may be that the
expected value is nonetheless high, and so they should believe it (which they
would accomplish by pressing the button). In short, if by “the deliberative
question whether to believe that P” Shah means the question “Should I
believe P?,” then to begin an argument against Equal Treatment by asserting
Transparency, without any further argument for it, is question-begging.
9. Equal Treatment and Skepticism
Perhaps the central challenge for a philosophical treatment of skepticism is
to identify, on the one hand, the ways in which skeptical arguments are
plausible and perhaps even correct; and, on the other, how they nonetheless
go wrong. Different responses to skepticism seek this balance in ways that
are more or less concessive to the skeptic. Some, such as Lewis (1996) and
Stroud (2002), are rather concessive; others, such as Moore (1962), Pryor
(2000), and Williamson (2000) are not. In this section I’ll describe how
Equal Treatment could be used to give an elegant and distinctive response
to skepticism that, while squarely on the concessive end of the spectrum,
nonetheless identifies a clear sense in which the skeptic is mistaken.
Those who are impressed by skeptical arguments feel the pull of the
thought that our evidence does not support our ordinary external world
beliefs over the hypothesis that we are brains in vats with deceptive percep-
tual experiences. Other skeptical arguments, targeting other subsets of our
ordinary beliefs, may render it similarly plausible that our evidence does
not support those beliefs.
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What I’d like to emphasize here is that Equal Treatment makes it possi-
ble for us to grant the skeptic’s claims about what our evidence supports
while nonetheless denying that we should give up our ordinary beliefs, or
that having those beliefs is irrational.
This general form of response can be developed in many different ways.
Here I will confine myself to a few key points. First, if we are assessing the
rationality of ordinary beliefs from the perspective of someone who still has
them, it is not difficult to make the case that, on Equal Treatment, such
beliefs are generally rational, even if they are not supported by the evi-
dence. Given how I think the world is—e.g. that I have hands, that moving
them in certain ways enables me to eat and survive, etc.—it is plausible that
I do better, generally speaking, to believe that the world is that way than to
suspend judgment (or to believe that the world is some other way).
What about someone who suspends judgment on ordinary external world
beliefs? (Perhaps this person encountered the argument for external world
skepticism before adopting Equal Treatment.) There are various considerations
that might convince such a person that external world beliefs are rational. For
example, they might reflect on the fact that those who suspend judgment are
guaranteed to not have true beliefs about the world, whereas those who believe
at least have a chance of believing truly. If one places sufficiently high value
on true belief, and sufficiently low value on lack of true belief, then, as pointed
out by William James (1979), it can be worth it to take the risk and believe.
Alternatively, one might reflect on certain projects one would like to com-
plete and discover that (as Crispin Wright (2004) suggests) a necessary condi-
tion for pursuing those projects is having certain external world beliefs. If
having a shot at completing one’s projects is sufficiently valuable, then
attempting to do so—and adopting the requisite beliefs—can be worth the risk.
Now, it is worth noting that these and other such lines of reasoning may
have no purchase on a completely global skeptic who suspends judgment on
everything and so has no beliefs whatsoever. However, Equal Treatment may
allow that believing would be rational even for such a person. For example,
suppose that simply wanting to do something gives one a reason to do it. Even
those who lack all beliefs may still have some desires. If, when they have a
visual experience, or an intellectual experience, or a memory experience, they
feel drawn to having certain beliefs—if they want to have those beliefs—then,
on Equal Treatment, it can be rational for them to do so.
In sum, Equal Treatment opens the door to a distinctive form of response
to skepticism: one in which we can concede to the skeptic that we lack evi-
dential support for the beliefs she targets, while insisting that it is nonethe-
less perfectly rational for us to have them.24
24 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for suggesting that I include a discus-
sion of Equal Treatment and skepticism.
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10. Conclusion
The rationality of a belief state, I have claimed, is determined not by evi-
dential support, but rather by applying whatever general principle is prop-
erly used in assessing the rationality of any other state. This principle of
equal treatment is not undermined by considerations of voluntariness: like
many other states, such as listening to music or wearing a raincoat, whether
belief is voluntary is a contingent matter, and varies from case to case; the
possible relevance of voluntariness to rationality can apply to all states
equally. Equal Treatment is also unaffected by the extent and the way in
which rationality may be relative to the agent’s perspective. A spectrum of
options, from subjective to objective, exists, and each is consistent with the
call for a unified theory of rationality. Moreover, Equal Treatment opens the
door to a distinctive and elegant response to skepticism.
One popular alternative view holds that there is a special rule for deter-
mining the rationality of a belief state: it is rational insofar as the proposi-
tion believed is supported by one’s evidence. A putative advantage of this
evidentialist view is its ability to explain why we ordinarily take truth-con-
duciveness to be important to the rationality of belief. But Equal Treatment
can explain this equally well, as we generally do better to believe the truth.
Moreover, Equal Treatment has the flexibility, which Evidentialism lacks, to
accommodate unusual cases in which non-evidential factors seem relevant
to the rationality of belief.
A variety of arguments for Evidentialism have been put forward, relying,
for example, on claims about the basis of belief, or the transparent nature of
belief. In each case I claimed that the argument does not go through.
Beliefs, just like other states, can be based on non-evidential considerations
in their favor, and non-evidential reasons can figure as premises in delibera-
tion whether to believe.
Another alternative to Equal Treatment has it that a belief can be simulta-
neously rational in one sense and irrational in another, incommensurable
sense. But this view is ill-suited to accommodate the natural thought that
rationality constitutes an ideal to which one might coherently aspire, and by
which one might be guided.
In short, when it comes to the rational assessment of states, we can
embrace Equal Treatment: there is no need to make an exception for
belief.25
25 Many thanks, for helpful comments and suggestions, to Selim Berker, Andrew Graham,
Ned Hall, Sophie Horowitz, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, Jeff McDonough, Sarah Moss, Pari-
mal Patil, Miriam Schoenfield, Susanna Siegel, Jonathan Way, an anonymous reviewer
for this journal, an audience at the 2014 Midwest Epistemology Workshop at the Univer-
sity of Michigan—Ann Arbor, an audience at MIT’s Epistemology Reading Group, and
participants in a fall 2014 graduate seminar at Harvard on the ethics of belief.
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